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Abstract: Challenging the predominant scholarly focus on international parliamentary 
institutions as the sole and sufficient object of inquiry into the global role of parliaments, this 
article argues that international interparliamentary relations do not occur merely within isolated 
forums, but may and do de facto evolve in layers of overlapping forums whenever circumstances 
allow it.  This article conceptualises multilayered international parliamentarism as developing in 
webs of formal and informal linkages between the same parliamentary institutions in a variety 
of bilateral and multilateral frameworks regarding the same region. To this end, I conduct an 
in-depth case study of bilateral and multilateral relations between the parliaments of the EU 
and Brazil through the lens of institutional arrangements as well as by examining the reaction 
of the Brazilian and certain other Latin American parliaments to the EU’s Returns Directive. 
The analysis shows that intensified international contacts among parliamentarians accentuate 
the deliberative function of parliaments and foster their ‘diplomatic’ actorship in foreign affairs 
in a concerted attempt to counterbalance globalisation-propelled ‘negotiated democracy’ 
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1. INTRODUCTION: GLOBALISING THE ROLE OF 
PARLIAMENTS 
In democracies, parliaments embody the principle of popular representation, thus 
ensuring that decisions made by their political community are infused with the 
interests, preferences and values of the electorate. Parliaments’ key role is to make 
legislation, adopt a budget and keep the executive in check as regards both policy 
making and implementation of law. Domestic politics and lawmaking are therefore 
the core of parliamentary business worldwide. However, the role of parliaments is 
gradually changing due to a variety of factors occurring in the last couple of 
decades. Globalisation has brought domestic and foreign policy much closer 
together. Concomitantly, the many projects of regional integration on virtually all 
continents incorporate some form of parliamentary body. This article analyses 
these contemporary phenomena through a detailed case study of the relations 
between the EU and Brazil and of their parliaments’ individual and collective 
entanglement in the adoption of the EU’s Returns Directive. The objective is to 
demonstrate that multilayered international parliamentarism operates not only 
within the EU, as the world’s most fertile site for interparliamentary cooperation, 
but also on the global stage and in less obvious situations. 
International parliamentarism, as a phenomenon whereby parliaments take an 
active part in world affairs and perform a plethora of activities beyond the 
constitutional confines of their legal orders, is a curious one for several reasons. 
Indeed, Šabic rightly questions why parliamentarians engage in this type of action 
despite the sheer number of disincentives, which are rooted in the constituency-
oriented, local or even parochial nature of their work.1 In her New World Order, 
Slaughter speaks of legislative networks as weak forums with little influence 
precisely because of parliamentarians’ electoral ‘dependence’, whereby they are 
elected to defend the interests of their voters and not the interests of the voters of 
other countries, regions and entities. Therefrom flow the other constraints such as 
lack of benefit for re-election, lack of time due to the need to focus on domestic 
matters, quick turnover of parliamentarians in and out of office following electoral 
cycles, and low visibility of their international efforts.2 
Even so, most authors view international parliamentarism as positive and 
desirable. For Šabic parliamentarians acting globally add democratic legitimacy and 
transparency to international affairs by resorting to institutional pressure, 
persuasion and advocacy in order to promote their positions.3 They thereby 
stimulate public debate and facilitate the development of shared norms and values 
                                                     
1 Z. Šabic, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International 
Parliamentary Institutions’ (2008) 61 Parliamentary Affairs, 256. 
2 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 105. 
3 Šabic, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International 
Parliamentary Institutions’ (2008), 255 and 258. 
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in an interdependent world.4 Slaughter, for her part, argues that the legislators’ role 
need not be to directly affect international policy making but can also be to 
enhance their monitoring of the international activity of the executive branch.5 
They may also engage in capacity building through training and technical 
assistance programmes.6 Importantly, she views international parliamentary 
institutions (IPIs) both as catalysts, sparking further integration or facilitating the 
removal of trade barriers, and as correctives, rectifying the imbalances created by 
executive dominance in international affairs.7 In this vein, Kraft-Kasack accurately 
observes that while policy outputs are improved through political 
internationalisation, the democratic legitimacy of such processes is acutely 
deficient.8 She argues that transnational parliamentary assemblies only marginally 
reduce the democratic deficit of international governance, due to their aloofness 
from the public, insufficient incorporation of their work in domestic parliaments 
and various institutional shortcomings that hamper constancy and coherence of 
their work, such as understaffed secretariats and the lack of permanent 
delegations.9 Despite this, she concludes that transnational parliamentary 
assemblies may ‘contribute to the formation of a transnational public sphere’.10 
Cutler, too, maintains that IPIs have a ‘special communicative role in world 
society’.11 Similarly, Malamud and Stavridis submit that even though regional 
integration parliaments more often than not fail to carry out distinctive 
parliamentary functions, they aid intraregional communication and nurture a 
shared regional identity among political elites.12 Yet the existing literature treats 
international parliamentarism as a standalone integrative force without paying heed 
to the diversity of underlying relations between their members across various 
forums. 
This article argues that international interparliamentary relations do not occur 
merely within isolated forums, but may and do de facto evolve in layers of 
overlapping forums whenever circumstances allow it. I dub this phenomenon 
                                                     
4 Z. Šabic, ‘Democracy across Borders: Parliamentarians and International Public Spheres’ (2008) 15 
Javnost–The Public, 77. 
5 Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), pp.122 and 129. It has similarly been argued that international 
parliamentarism may help to prevent lethargy and non-responsiveness of governmental actors. See Šabic, 
‘Democracy across Borders: Parliamentarians and International Public Spheres’ (2008), 80. 
6 A.-M. Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European 
Way of Law)’ in J.E. Nijman and A. Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between National and 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 118. 
7 Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), 119. 
8 C. Kraft-Kasack, ‘Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies: A Remedy for the Democratic Deficit of 
International Governance?’ (2008) 31 West European Politics, 534. 
9 Kraft-Kasack, ‘Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies: A Remedy for the Democratic Deficit of 
International Governance?’ (2008) 31 West European Politics, 552-553. 
10 Kraft-Kasack, ‘Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies: A Remedy for the Democratic Deficit of 
International Governance?’ (2008) 31 West European Politics, 553. 
11 R. Cutler, ‘International Parliamentary Instutitions as Organizations’ (2013) 4 Journal of International 
Organizations Studies, 104. 
12 M. Andrés and S. Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’ in B. Reinalda 
(ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 101. 
12 N. Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and Postnational Public Law: A Tale of Two Neologisms’ 
(2012) 3 Transnational Legal Theory, 114. 
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multilayered international parliamentarism. Its occurrence is a corollary of the 
incremental process of the globalisation of parliaments as an institutional response 
to the globalisation of law and politics in general. Parliaments’ functions are 
moulded by the ever narrower gaps between nations, states and citizens. Increased 
international contacts among parliaments foster their ‘diplomatic’ actorship in 
foreign affairs in a concerted attempt to counterbalance globalisation-propelled 
intergovernmental and transgovernmental ways of doing politics and making law. 
This in turn accentuates the deliberative function of parliaments and attenuates 
globalisation’s push towards ‘negotiated democracy’, whereby governments agree 
on common rules with other governments without much parliamentary 
interference. The development of international parliamentarism via mutually 
interlaced forums helps move parliamentary democracy closer towards 
‘deliberative negotiation democracy’.13 This article therefore subscribes to a 
systemic approach to deliberative democracy, which posits that no single 
deliberative forum, including parliaments, is sufficiently capable of legitimising 
decisions on its own. Instead, the interdependencies and interactions between and 
among individual sites for the politicisation of policy making ought to be 
integrated into the analysis because they can make up for the deficiencies of any 
given site and thus improve the democratic quality of the entire system.14 
Speaking about the future of global governance, David Kennedy indeed 
argued that the objective of ‘new politics’ is to carry the democratic values of 
individual rights, economic self-sufficiency, citizenship, community empowerment 
and political participation to the sites of global and transnational authority.15 This 
opening and multiplication of arenas for political contestation, conflict and 
struggle in search of greater conversation, heterogeneity, interaction and ethical 
pluralism is precisely where multilayered international parliamentarism makes its 
greatest contribution. Conducting parliamentary work across layers fertilises the 
political stratum that conditions the creation, implementation and application of 
law rather than nurturing parliaments’ lawmaking capacity as such. 
The diversification of the avenues of parliamentary communication 
contributes to addressing legislative divergences, interdependencies and 
externalities by means of argument-based institutional pressure in the form of 
‘parliamentary lobbying’. International parliamentarism is hence a massive 
conveyor belt for interest mediation between the centres of democratic gravity, 
which remain entrenched in domestic political arenas, structured by domestic 
levers of constitutionalism and arbitrated through domestic public spheres. The 
                                                     
13 A. Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in J.E. Nijman and A. Nollkaemper (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 281. 
14 J. Mansbridge et al, ‘A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy’ in J. Parkinson and J. 
Mansbridge (eds), Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 2-3. 
15 D. Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in J.L. Dunoff and and J.P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling 
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 67. 
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argument that globalisation and growing interdependence falsify the presumption 
that national democracy is the most inclusive and deliberative locus of decision 
making is still a difficult one to make,16 because domestic political realms continue 
to guarantee the highest degree of participation, the greatest possibility for 
structured deliberation, and the most extensive safeguards for the enforcement of 
parliamentary rights in the political process. The globalisation of parliaments 
therefore still has a chiefly domestic effect. International parliamentarism enhances 
domestic law, politics and governance without putting them in jeopardy. It 
complements national democracy rather than supplanting it.  
The same applies to the European Union. The international activity of the 
European Parliament (EP) does not thwart EU democracy, but upgrades it by 
enriching the public debate. In this regard, Bieber’s description of the EP’s global 
endeavour confirms the internal rootedness thereof: 
 
The European Parliament’s activities in the sphere of general international 
politics provides the most striking example of a parliament’s modern role in 
this field […] The Parliament’s role as an international forum may amplify the 
common values of western civilization and hence renders them effective 
either by influencing governments of Member States and third nations or by 
directly strengthening them as parameters of the international order. The 
international effect of Parliament’s role as a forum is based on an internal function which 
only the Parliament can fulfill: the capacity to aggregate the internal support 
of the European peoples for those basic values.17 
 
As the most advanced transnational assembly in the world, the EP has the greatest 
democratic credentials to lead the parliamentary legitimisation of decision making 
beyond the state and has so far played a ‘crucial role in shaping interparliamentary 
relations at all levels of regional cooperation’.18 This is why this article adopts an 
EU perspective. 
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we conceptualise multilayered 
international parliamentarism by dissecting its structure and explaining global 
parliamentary layering. Second, in order to depict the existence and operation of 
parliamentary interdependence on the international level, we conduct a thorough 
case study of EU-Brazil relations. We analyse the legal and political bases for 
bilateral interparliamentary cooperation between them through the lens of formal 
arrangements as well as through examples from political praxis. To illustrate the 
multilayered character of interparliamentary liaison, we continue with an 
                                                     
16 S. Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’ in J.L. 
Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 404. 
17 R. Bieber, ‘Democratic Control of International Relations of the European Union’ in E. Cannizzaro 
(ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 
110 (emphasis added). 
18 A. Cofelice and S. Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution 
(IPI)’ (2014) 19 European Foreign Affairs Review, 165. 
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examination of the multilateral parliamentary links between these two polities, 
which evolve within the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) 
as well as through the EP’s cooperation with the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) 
and the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino). Third, on this basis we exemplify 
multilayered international parliamentarism with an in-depth empirical insight into 
the reaction of Latin American parliaments to the EU’s Returns Directive. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn on the advantages of multilayered international 
parliamentarism for the democratisation of international politics, since this 
phenomenon is not restricted to the EP’s global actorness but may apply in 





2. THE CONCEPT OF MULTILAYERED INTERNATIONAL 
PARLIAMENTARISM 
 
2.1. THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARISM 
 
Parliamentary engagement in international affairs is chiefly threefold and consists 
of influencing foreign policy domestically, conducting parliamentary diplomacy 
and establishing parliamentary bodies of international organisations.19 These three 
activities are closely intertwined because, in the absence of significant decision-
making power, domestic scrutiny of foreign policy incites parliaments to 
externalise their work beyond the borders of their polities in order to maximise 
their effectiveness, increase their impact on executive decisions and, generally, 
counteract the ‘hollowing out of domestic democracy’.20 By the same token, 
parliamentary diplomacy is the key substantive component and a conditio sine qua 
non of the parliamentarisation of international organisations. This last type of 
parliamentary engagement is the most advanced manifestation of what Neil 
Walker has labeled ‘transnational parliamentarianism’.21 There is, nevertheless, a 
whole spectrum of appellations for this phenomenon. The most common one is 
international parliamentary institutions (IPIs), which Cutler defines as international 
institutional forums for multilateral deliberations in which at least three states or 
transgovernmental units are represented by parliamentarians.22 They can be further 
classified into international parliamentary organs (IPOs) and international 
                                                     
19 Malamud and Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’ in The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Non-State Actors (2011), 101. 
20 Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in New Perspectives on the Divide between National and 
International Law (2007), 284. 
21 Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and Postnational Public Law: A Tale of Two Neologisms’ 
(2012) 3 Transnational Legal Theory, 80. 
22 Cutler, ‘International Parliamentary Institutions as Organizations’ (2013) 4 Journal of International 
Organizations Studies, 106. 
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parliamentary associations (IPAs),23 which differ insofar as the former belong to 
intergovernmental organisations while the latter are independent, self-constituted 
groups of parliamentarians. One may also speak of international or transnational 
parliamentary assemblies. 
Yet, whichever phrase one uses to define international parliamentary action, 
each of them as a rule refers to multilateral parliamentary cooperation. The 
shortcoming of the existing literature is that it places excessive focus on IPIs and 
treats them as singular manifestations of international parliamentarism. This skews 
the portrayal of the political reality, which is denser than the current approaches 
suggest. This article submits, first, that bilateral forums are also important 
frameworks for international parliamentarism and, second, that there are a 
plethora of intricate interactions across and between these multilateral and bilateral 
forums. On the one hand, while multilateral cooperation may be the most visible 
form of international parliamentarism, national parliamentarians (MPs, senators 
and peers), regional parliamentarians (members of regional integration 
parliaments) and supranational ones (members of the EP or MEPs) engage in 
bilateral relations of an international character too.24 A notable example of it is the 
Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue between the EP and the US Congress.25 As this 
article shows, a similar arrangement has been instituted between the EP and the 
Brazilian National Congress (Congresso Nacional do Brasil). On the other hand, there 
are also bilateral relations between IPIs themselves, such as those between the EP 
and Parlasur. All of these frameworks are institutionalised forms of 
parliamentarism which merit a separate place on the global parliamentary map.26 
  
2.2. THE LAYERING OF INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARISM 
As a result of the proliferation of international parliamentary bodies, the layers of 
interparliamentary cooperation have become more diverse. Typically, the 
engagement of any given parliament in any given region is exhausted by its 
participation in one international interparliamentary body established for that 
purpose. This mostly takes the form of an IPI. For example, in the Mediterranean 
region, the EP is represented in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 
as the parliamentary component of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.27 In the 
                                                     
23 Šabic, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International 
Parliamentary Institutions’ (2008) 61 Parliamentary Affairs, 258. 
24 C. Quispe, ‘La Cooperación Interparlamentaria en América Latina’ (2012) 2 Revista Andina de Estudios 
Políticos, 71. 
25 D. Jancic, ‘The European Parliament and EU-US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation’ in 
E. Fahey and D. Curtin (eds), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the 
EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2014). 
26 In broad functional terms, one may also conceive of international parliamentarism in the context of 
‘transnational advocacy networks’ inasmuch as international parliamentary bodies frequently resort to 
advocacy techniques to achieve their goals. See M.E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 9. 
27 See R. Pace and S. Stelios. ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 2004–2008: Assessing 
the First Years of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process’ (2010) 21 Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 90-113. 
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case of the region located at the EU’s eastern gates comprising certain post-Soviet 
states, the EP forms part of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, as the 
parliamentary element of the Eastern Partnership.28  
However, this paradigm of ‘unidimensional’ international parliamentarism has 
become inaccurate and the region of South America furnishes an excellent 
example. For instance, the EP meets with Chilean and Mexican parliamentarians 
both bilaterally within the respective EU-Chile and EU-Mexico Joint 
Parliamentary Committees and multilaterally within EuroLat and Parlatino. In the 
case of Brazil, interparliamentary cooperation evolves not only in the form of 
bilateral relations between the EP and the Brazilian Congress but also 
multilaterally through EuroLat, Parlasur and Parlatino. Common to these 
instances is the concurrent representation of the same parliamentary body in 
multiple international parliamentary forums devoted to the same region. 
The international activity of parliaments is therefore multifarious and, due to 
the transnational nature of contemporary policy making, it is likely to develop not 
only in the format of isolated parliamentary frameworks but in that of 
interconnected webs of parliaments. They may intersect within various 
international forums, whether bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal, more or 
less structured, and more or less empowered to issue pronouncements. This 
interconnectedness between the same parliamentary institutions across forums, 
regions and levels of governance casts the global role of parliaments as less 
fragmented than it prima facie appears. Consequently, more frequent contact 
between the same parliamentary institutions on different topics carries concrete 
mutual benefits. These include a greater potential for continuous debate and 
consultation on contentious matters and the maintenance of a firmer liaison 
between parliamentarians and their staff. This may help improve their 
understanding of the common challenges and threats facing their polities and 
catalyse the search for optimal policy solutions. In turn, this increases the 
likelihood of polities respecting each other’s legislation and implementing mutual 
agreements. Multilayered international collaboration between parliaments can 
therefore boost their say in global and domestic politics and corroborate their 
classic constitutional functions of legislating and ensuring executive accountability.  
International parliamentarism, furthermore, is multilayered not only horizontally, i.e. 
between two or more same parliaments, but also vertically, i.e. in a variety of 
formats. These formats may range from inter-delegation meetings, formalised 
personal committee-to-committee meetings, informal visits and videoconferences. 
With these elements in mind, I define multilayered international parliamentarism 
as the international activity that develops between the same parliamentary bodies 
in two or more interparliamentary forums in the same period regarding the same 
                                                     
28 See H. Kostanyan and B. Vandecasteele, ‘The EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly: The European 
Parliament as a Socializer of Its Counterparts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood?’ (2013) 5 College of 
Europe, EU Diplomacy Papers. 
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region. In the remaining sections, I operationalise this concept with the example 




3. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE BRAZILIAN 
CONGRESS: AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP? 
 
3.1. BILATERAL EU-BRAZIL INTERPARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS 
 
A. Legal Framework 
The importance of democracy in EU-Brazil relations are visible from the 1992 
Framework Cooperation Agreement,29 whose first Article states that their 
cooperation is based on the respect for the democratic principles and human 
rights. While regulating collaboration in the fields such as trade,30 investment, 
finance, industry and technology, the Agreement also acknowledges the value of 
mutual consultation on ‘international issues of mutual interest’.31 However, the 
Agreement does not mention interparliamentary relations as such. 
In the EU, the Agreement is operationalised through Brazil Country Strategy 
Papers, which the European Commission (Commission) publishes in order to 
provide guidance for the implementation of the collaborative arrangements 
agreed. There have so far been two such Papers, one for 2001-2006 and the other 
for 2007-2013. The latter states that the key objectives of enhancing bilateral 
relations are to improve the sectoral dialogues between the EU and Brazil as well 
as to expand cooperation, exchanges and mutual awareness between relevant 
institutions.32 While not explicitly stated, this encompasses interparliamentary 
collaboration. The Commission furthermore seeks to widen the interregional 
political dialogue and facilitate the development of EU-Mercosur relations.33 
The key forums for bilateral EU-Brazil relations are summits, which are 
intergovernmental gatherings of European and Brazilian leaders at the highest 
political level. The first such summit took place in Lisbon in July 2007 and 
officially established a strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil in order to 
address bilateral and multilateral challenges.34 The second summit, which was held 
                                                     
29 Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the 
Federative Republic of Brazil of 29 June 1992 [1995] OJ L262/54. 
30 See more on this in: R. Leal-Arcas, ‘The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards 
Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas’ (2009) 32 Fordham International Law Journal, 382-386. 
31 Art.2 thereof. 
32 European Commission, Brazil Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 [2007] E/2007/889, 26. 
33 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘Towards an 
EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership’, COM (2007) 281, 15. 
34 See accounts in: R.G. Whitman and A.P. Rodt, ‘EU-Brazil Relations: A Strategic Partnership?’ (2012) 
17 European Foreign Affairs Review,  27-44; E.M. Ceia, ‘The New Approach of the European Union towards 
the Mercosur and the Strategic Partnership with Brazil’ (2008) 61 Studia Diplomatica, 81-96; M. Emerson 
and R. Flôres, Enhancing the Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership: From the Bilateral and Regional to the Global 
(Brussels and Rio de Janeiro: CEPS and FGV, 2013); B. Znojek, ‘The European Union and Brazil as 
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in Rio de Janeiro in December 2008, was of paramount importance for bilateral 
parliamentarism. The then adopted Joint Action Plan laid down a fivefold scheme 
to construct the Euro-Brazilian strategic partnership and one of them is through 
people-to-people contacts. Within this category, the Action Plan promotes 
twofold interparliamentary interaction: (a) by initiating a regular structured 
dialogue between MEPs and Brazilian Congressmen; and (b) by direct inter-
committee contacts on all subjects on common interest.35 At the moment, there 
exist some 30 sectoral dialogues between the EU and Brazil, which are aimed at 
exchanging know-how in various areas.36 One of them is the dialogue between the 
EP and the Brazilian Congress. The fourth summit, held in Brasília in July 2010, 
acknowledged that bilateral interparliamentary cooperation has commenced in the 
form of informal visits, for example the visit of the EP’s Committee on 
International Trade and its Delegation for relations with the Mercosur countries.37 
The fifth summit, organised in Brussels in October 2011, brought new impetus. It 
recognised that ‘parliaments are a fundamental expression of democratic values 
and of people’s representation in the democratic processes’ and concluded that 
visits and exchanges between the EP and the Brazilian Congress had been 
increasing and solidifying since the onset of the strategic partnership. Both sides 
expressed commitment to a further strengthening of the interparliamentary 
dialogue.38 This dialogue is supported by the MEPs, who in 2009 called upon EU 
institutions and the Brazilian Government to provide them with ‘regular and 
detailed information on the state of play of the strategic partnership’.39 
 
B. Internal Parliamentary Organisation 
While the EP currently possesses no internal body specifically for EU-Brazil 
relations, in a 2012 resolution MEPs stated that the creation of a delegation for 
relations with Brazil could be considered.40 On the same occasion, they advised 
that EU Delegations in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) should include EP liaison officers so as to: (a) foster a greater 
understanding of the national parliamentary dimension in each of those countries; 
(b) promote closer bilateral cooperation and dialogue between the EP and their 
national parliaments; and (c) promote democratic accountability of the decision-
making processes in the G-8 and the G-20. These initiatives signify that, although 
Mercosur has been the main framework of EU-Brazil cooperation, there has been 
                                                                                                                                       
Privileged Partners? Difficult Path to an Authentic Strategic Partnership’ (2012) 24 Polish Institute for 
International Affairs Policy Paper, 1-8.  
35 2nd EU-Brazil Summit, ‘Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership–Joint Action Plan’, Rio de Janeiro, 22 
December 2008, 39. 
36 See http://sectordialogues.org/en/pagina-estatica/project/presentation [Accessed 27 March 2014]. 
37 4th EU-Brazil Summit, ‘Joint Statement’, Brasília, 14 July 2010, point 25, 11. 
38 5th EU-Brazil Summit, ‘Joint Statement’, Brussels, 4 October 2011, 27-28. 
39 Recommendation of the European Parliament to the Council of 12 March 2009 on the European 
Union-Brazil Strategic Partnership [2010] OJ C87E/168, point 1(z)(ad)-(ae). 
40 Resolution of the European Parliament on the EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other 
emerging powers: objectives and strategies [2013] OJ C239E/1, point 28. 
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a shift in priorities whereby Brazil is viewed as ‘a power in its own right’ and as ‘an 
increasingly important partner for Europe in dealing with all of the major policy 
challenges that will need to be addressed in the twenty-first century’.41 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Câmara 
dos Deputados) created in June 2008 a bicameral parliamentary group for relations 
with the EU.42 It is composed of 78 MPs and 22 senators. As a member of this 
group mentioned, ‘parliamentary diplomacy is as important as official diplomacy. 
For that reason, this parliamentary group will interact with the EP in various 
matters, such as immigration, business, customs barriers, sanitary barriers and 
education projects’.43 In addition, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry has a 
Department for Europe,44 whose work is appraised by Congress. 
 
C. Mutual Parliamentary Awareness and Pronouncement 
The following empirical examples illustrate manifold regulatory interdependence 
between the EU and Brazil. It is shown that their legislatures pay heed to the 
interregional dimension of policy making and that they keep a watchful eye over 
each other’s decision-making processes.45 
The EP occasionally comments on Brazilian legislative initiatives that are of 
global or interregional importance, gives its views thereon, and offers 
recommendations. For instance, some nine months in advance of the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 
June 2012 to address global economic and environmental challenges, the EP 
passed a resolution in which concern was expressed about the Forest Code that 
the Brazilian Senate was due to adopt. The reason for this alert was that the Code 
would ‘exacerbate deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, thus hindering 
international climate change mitigation efforts’. MEPs urged Brazil to ‘make a 
clear commitment to protect the Amazon forest and stem criminal harassment of 
representatives of civil society pursuing environmental protection’.46 On another 
occasion, the EP invited developing countries to follow the example of Brazil’s 
successful Bolsa Familia (Family Grant) programme and devise similar social 
protection schemes to shield the most vulnerable members of their societies.47 
When it comes to food policy, the MEPs raised objections regarding, on the one 
                                                     
41 R. Roett, The New Brazil (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 141-142. 
42 Resolução da Câmara dos Deputados no. 3/08 que cria o grupo parlamentar Brasil-União Européia, Diário da 
Câmara dos Deputados of 6 June 2008, 25589. 
43 César Halum MP, see http://t1noticias.com.br/antigas/noticias/halum-sera-empossado-nesta-quarta-
no-grupo-parlamentar-brasil-uniao-europeia-na-cni-em-brasilia/23581/#.UzRRLY-NwSw [Accessed 27 
March 2014]. 
44 See www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/conheca-o-ministerio/organograma/subsecretaria-geral-
politica-i/deu-departamento-da-europa [Accessed 27 March 2014]. 
45 See on EU-Brazilian interdependence in many areas: A. Valladão, ‘L’UE et le Brésil: Un Partenariat 
Naturel’ in G. Grevi and Á. de Vasconcelos (eds), Chaillot Paper No. 109 ‘Partnerships for Effective 
Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia’ (EUISS: Paris, 2008), 34 et seq. 
46 Resolution of European Parliament on developing a common EU position ahead of the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) [2011] OJ C22E/114, points 60 and 61. 
47 Resolution of the European Parliament on the impact of the financial and economic crisis on human 
rights [2013] OJ C242E/260, point 25. 
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hand, reports by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency on the 
widespread use of pesticides that are banned in the EU and that as such carry 
grave health risks and, on the other hand, reports by the EU Food and Veterinary 
Office on the ‘failure of Brazilian beef to meet EU producer and consumer 
standards’.48 In the same policy field, the EP was also mindful of the repercussions 
of EU policies for Brazil. To wit, the MEPs prompted the Commission to assess 
the impact of the reform of the EU’s common organisation of the sugar market 
for Brazil’s policies on sugar production and processing. The objective was to 
deter Brazil’s ‘unsustainable latifundary method of sugar production’, which is 
dominated by a small number of individuals to the detriment of the many workers 
in sugar fields and factories.49 In yet other pronouncements, the EP emphasised 
the relevance of Brazilian policies for the EU. For example, in order to improve 
EU competitiveness and remove barriers to global trade, MEPs adopted a 
resolution requesting the Commission, when framing EU policies, to carry out 
systematic evaluations of similar policies by the EU’s major partners, among 
which Brazil.50 EU-Brazil parliamentary cooperation has also been promoted in 
the context of Internet regulation. Namely, the EP underlined the importance of 
raising the parliamentary profile of the Internet Governance Forum and expressed 
eagerness to cooperate with the Brazilian, Indian and other interested assemblies 
on these matters.51 
For its part, the Brazilian Congress maintains regular cognizance of EU 
affairs in a variety of formats, including hearings with MEPs and public expert 
debates. For instance, in October 2013, Congress hosted a working group of the 
EP’s Delegation for relations with Mercosur in order to discuss the association 
agreement with Mercosur and the development of the EU-Brazil partnership. 
Transpiring from the Delegation’s meetings with representatives of the external 
affairs committees of both Houses of Congress, was the EU’s awareness of the 
politico-economic importance of Brazil and its leadership within Mercosur.52 The 
same month, the Chamber of Deputies’ Committee for External Relations and 
National Defence held a hearing with Daniel Cohn-Bendit MEP on climate 
change and environment protection.53 Furthermore, in March 2014 the Chamber 
                                                     
48 Resolution of the European Parliament on EU agriculture and international trade [2011] OJ C199E/48, 
points 52 and 53. 
49 Resolution of the European Parliament on the forthcoming reform of the common organisation of the 
market in sugar [2005] OJ C320E/271, point 30. 
50 Resolution of the European Parliament on the Single Market review: tackling barriers and inefficiencies 
through better implementation and enforcement [2007] OJ C187E/80, point 43. 
51 Resolution of the European Parliament on the second Internet Governance Forum held in Rio de 
Janeiro from 12-15 November 2007 [2008] OJ C61E/252, point 4. 
52 See 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/20131101_01_pt.htm  
[Accessed 28 March 2014]. 
53 Requerimento no. 315/2013 (Alfredo Sirkis MP) of 16 July 2013, see 
www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=585557 [Accessed 27 March 
2014]. 
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hosted a visit by an EP delegation, whose aim was to discuss the internal 
functioning of the two parliaments, such as the legislative process, voting and the 
structure and operation of committees and parliamentary groups. The meeting 
resulted in the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding on the 
International Technical Cooperation, which was also signed by the Brazilian 
Senate (Senado). The goal of this Memorandum is to continue to share 
parliamentary information, practices and working methods as well as to increase 
mutual learning through exchange programmes for administrative staff.54 The 
Senate also organises expert hearings on EU topics. For example, the impact of 
the Eurozone crisis on EU-Brazil commercial relations and on the Brazilian 
economy was publically discussed in the Committee for External Relations and 
National Defence in September 2011 and March 2012.55 This is precisely the 
period surrounding the EU’s adoption of the so-called Six Pack of measures 
intended to reform Stability and Growth Pact. It has indeed been argued that, 
while the EU remains an attractive commercial partner to Brazil, the sovereign 
debt crisis has severely challenged the appeal of the EU model for regional 
integration in Latin America.56 Another example is the examination by Brazilian 
senators of the EU’s Water Framework Directive.57 Due to the similarities 
between the EU’s and Brazil’s difficulties in implementing policies in the very 
diverse regions existing within their territories, in May 2009 the Senate’s 
Committee for Environment, Consumer Protection and Supervision and Control 
conducted a comparison between EU legislation and the National Water 
Resources Policy enacted by the Brazilian Water Act.58 The Committee Chairman, 
Renato Casagrande, suggested that EU policy could be used as a model for 
regulating transnational water paths within Mercosur.59 
These examples document the wealth of advocacy practices of the EU and 
Brazilian parliaments in numerous policy fields. Their importance lies in the 
mutual awareness of the respective regulatory and decision-making processes. 
These are crucial ingredients of multilayered international parliamentarism because 
the search for policy rapprochement may spill over to mutual multilateral forums, 
as outlined below. 
 
3.2. MULTILATERAL EU-BRAZIL INTERPARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS 
 
The lynchpin of multilayered international parliamentarism is the fact that 
representatives of two same parliamentary bodies meet in different international 
                                                     
54 See http://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/materias/2014/03/21/diretores-firmam-acordo-
permanente-de-cooperacao-entre-parlamentos-brasileiro-e-europeu [Accessed 28 March 2014].  
55 See www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/CRE/audPub.asp [Accessed 27 March 2014]. 
56 E. Lazarou, ‘A Paradigm in Trouble? The Effects of the Euro Crisis on the European Model for 
Regional Integration in South America’ in L. Fioramonti (ed.), Regions and Crises: New Challenges for 
Contemporary Regionalisms (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 195. 
57 Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 
[2000] OJ L327/1. 
58 Lei no. 9.433 of 8 January 1997. 
59 Jornal do Senado, Ano XV, No. 3.024 of 22 May 2009, 6. 
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parliamentary forums devoted to the same region. In the case of the EU and 
Brazil, this unravels within three frameworks: EuroLat, Mercosur and Parlatino. I 
examine them in turn below. 
 
A. Cooperation within the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) 
The creation of EuroLat was strongly advocated by the EP. In November 2001, 
MEPs adopted a resolution recognising that EU-Latin American parliamentary 
dialogue has a role in ‘lending legitimacy to the different integration processes 
under way in both regions’ and that it should be modernised by setting up an EU-
Latin American Transatlantic Assembly.60 In April 2006, the EP reiterated the 
need for such an Assembly, while undertaking to strengthen biregional 
parliamentary diplomacy through the network of standing and ad hoc parliamentary 
delegations to interparliamentary forums and by requiring the inclusion of EP 
liaison officers in the main Commission delegations in the region.61 
On 8 November 2006, EuroLat was established in Brussels as a parliamentary 
dimension of the Biregional Strategic Partnership between the EU, Latin America 
and the Caribbean (EU-LAC).62 This multilateral parliamentary body succeeded 
the EU-Latin American Interparliamentary Conference, which had convened 
biennially since 1974. EuroLat gathers 150 parliamentarians: 75 MEPs and 75 
delegates from the Latin American component, which consists of Parlatino, 
Parlasur, the Andean Parliament, the Central American Parliament and the Joint 
Parliamentary Committees with Mexico and Chile. EuroLat has an Executive 
Secretariat, a Governing Board, a Plenary Assembly and three standing 
committees.63 The Council of the EU and the Commission may actively 
participate in EuroLat’s work. 
According to the Constituent Act, the role of EuroLat is to ‘debate, control 
and review’ all questions relating to the Partnership.64 These questions cover a 
broad range of matters including democracy, external policy, governance, 
integration, peace, human rights, education, environment, culture as well as 
economic, financial, commercial and social affairs.65 In these policy areas EuroLat 
may adopt resolutions, recommendations, opinions, messages and statements for 
the attention of EU-LAC summits and ministerial groups and conferences 
                                                     
60 Resolution of the European Parliament on a global partnership and a common strategy for relations 
between the European Union and Latin America [2002] OJ C140E/569, recital H, points 5(1) and 9. 
61 Resolution of the European Parliament on a stronger partnership between the European Union and 
Latin America [2006] OJ C296E/123, points 8(a), 16 and 42. 
62 M.C. González, ‘Eurolat: Une Assemblée Parlementaire Euro-Latino-Américaine’ (2008) 515 Revue du 
Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne, 94-95. See also a description of its basic features in: S. Stavridis et 
al, ‘The Origins, Structures and Functions of the Euro-Mediterranean and Euro-Latin American 
Interparliamentary Assemblies’ in O. Costa et al. (eds), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and 
Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 221-226. 
63 Art.4 EuroLat Constituent Act. 
64 Art.5(a) EuroLat Constituent Act. 
65 Art.2 EuroLat Constituent Act. 
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devoted to the development of the Partnership.66 EuroLat members may also put 
questions for oral or written answer to the ministerial bodies of the Latin 
American regional integration organisations, the Presidency-in-Office of the EU-
LAC Summit, the Council of the EU and the Commission.67 Written questions 
and answers are published by the EU in its Official Journal and by the 
participating regional integration parliaments. Oral questions are held each session 
upon decision to this effect by the Executive Bureau and they last up to two 
hours. The said executive bodies are then invited to give brief answers and a 
debate may follow if requested by twenty or more EuroLat members. 
Given its composition, breadth of scope and the existence of committees that 
ensure the completion of preparatory works in between the yearly conventions of 
the Plenary Assembly,68 EuroLat provides a forum for ongoing deliberation 
between MEPs and Brazilian parliamentarians, who may be part of Parlatino and 
Parlasur delegations. As proposed by two commentators, an early warning system, 
inspired by that applied in the European Union between national parliaments and 
EU institutions,69 could be installed within EuroLat to remedy the lack of 
coordination between legislative initiatives of biregional interest and to avoid the 
duplication of work where approaches converge.70 Besides this potential for policy 
collaboration, it has been argued that EuroLat is the most adequate forum for 
maintaining a community of values between the European and Latin American 
regions.71  
 
B. Cooperation between the EP and the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) 
Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur or the Common Market of the Southern Cone) 
was established by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991. While this regional 
organisation was founded by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Paraguay 
was suspended in June 2012, Venezuela became a full member in July 2012, and 
Bolivia has been en route to membership since December 2012. Democracy lay at 
the root of Mercosur and there is ‘huge and incontrovertible evidence that all the 
key players perceived […] democracy as an important factor for integration in the 
                                                     
66 Art.5(c)-(d) EuroLat Constituent Act in conjunction with arts 16-18 EuroLat Rules of Procedure of 8 
November 2006, as amended in 2007, 2009 and 2013. 
67 Arts 20-21 EuroLat Rules of Procedure. 
68 Art.7 EuroLat Constituent Act. 
69 See I. Cooper, ‘A “Virtual Third Chamber” for the European Union? National Parliaments after the 
Treaty of Lisbon’ (2012) 35 West European Politics 441-465; D Jancic, ‘Representative Democracy across 
Levels? National Parliaments and EU Constitutionalism’ (2012) 8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy, 227-265; P. Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and 
Empirical Reality (London: Routledge, 2012). 
70 J.J.F. Alles and M.T.F. Alles, ‘La Cooperación Interparlamentaria Union Europea-Iberoamérica: Una 
Estrategia entre el Marketing Político y la Integración Birregional’ in Europa-América Latina. Dos Caminos, 
¿Un Destino Común? (Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores, 2012), 62. 
71 I. Vittini, ‘La Asamblea Euro-Latinoamericana EuroLat. Antecendentes y su Importancia para la 
Promoción de la Comunidad de Valores’ in Europa-América Latina. Dos Caminos, ¿Un Destino Común? 
(Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores, 2012), 37. 
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Southern Cone’.72 Apart from the Common Market Council, Common Market 
Group, Trade Commission, Economic-Social Consultative Forum and 
Administrative Secretariat, Mercosur has its own Parliament.73 Envisaged originally 
as the Joint Parliamentary Committee,74 the 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol specified 
that it was to be appointed by the participating national parliaments and entrusted 
with the speeding up of domestic implementation of Mercosur decisions.75 In 
December 2005, a Constitutive Protocol replaced the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee with a directly elected Mercosur Parliament.76 While laying down its 
organisation and competence, which does not include legislation,77 the Protocol 
charges Parlasur with ‘maintaining institutional relations with parliaments of third 
countries and other legislative institutions’, which encompasses the EP.78 
EU-Mercosur relations were established in 1995 by means of an Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in 1999.79 This 
Agreement strengthens the existing relations between the two regions and sets the 
ground for an interregional association.80 Cooperation is to be developed in many 
diverse fields, including economy, trade, intellectual property, energy, transport, 
technology and environment. To this end, a political dialogue on bilateral and 
multilateral issues is instituted at the level of the respective executive branches 
(Heads of State, ministers and senior officials).81 However, although the 
Agreement makes no mention of interparliamentary cooperation, it does 
encourage ‘closer relations between the Parties and their respective institutions’,82 
particularly by fostering regular exchanges of information, advice and know-how.83 
The Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue promotes ‘contacts, information 
exchanges, and consultation, especially meetings at the appropriate level between 
                                                     
72 G.L. Gardini, The Origins of Mercosur: Democracy and Regionalization in South America (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 151. 
73 Art.1 Ouro Preto Protocol of 16 December 1994. 
74 Art.24 thereof. 
75 Arts 22-25 Ouro Preto Protocol. 
76 Art.6 Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament of 9 December 2005. 
77 The powers and achievements of Parlasur have so far been rather limited. A. Malamud and C. Dri, 
‘Spillover Effects and Supranational Parliaments: The Case of Mercosur’ (2013) 19 Journal of Iberian and 
Latin American Research, 235. 
78 Art.4(16) Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament. 
79 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the other part [1996] 
OJ L69/4. See further: G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, ‘Perspectives for a New Regionalism: Relations 
between the EU and the Mercosur’ (2000) 5 European Foreign Affairs Review, 561–579; P. Bessa-Rodrigues, 
‘European Union-Mercosul: In Search of a “New” Relationship?’ (1999) 4 European Foreign Affairs Review, 
81–98; S. Page, ‘The Relationship between the European Union and Mercosur’ (1999) 34 International 
Spectator, 91-108; S. Santander, ‘The European Partnership with Mercosur: A Relationship Based on 
Strategic and Neo–Liberal Principles’ (2005) 27 Journal of European Integration, 285-306. 
80 Art.2(1) thereof. Negotiations on an Association Agreement began in 2000 and, after their suspension 
in 2004, they were continued in 2010 and are currently ongoing. See a practitioner’s view on this: A. 
Klom, ‘Mercosur and Brazil: A European Perspective’ (2003) 79 International Affairs, 351-368. 
81 Art.3 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement. 
82 Art.2(2) thereof (emphasis added). 
83 Art.19 thereof.  
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the various Mercosur and European Union bodies’, albeit that the provisions that follow 
specify collaborative action of an executive nature.84 These references nevertheless 
facilitate cooperation between the EU and Mercosur parliaments. Indeed, 
Mercosur’s Joint Parliamentary Committee has periodically met with the EP since 
1996. Until May 2008, there were 13 interparliamentary meetings between the EU 
and Mercosur.85 
In its Regional Strategy Paper for Mercosur for 2007-2013, the Commission 
assessed that Mercosur’s democracy and transparency deficiencies will ‘only partly 
be addressed’ by Parlasur.86 Therefore, the EU’s first priority is the 
institutionalisation of Mercosur and the support for Parlasur’s development.87 The 
general objective is to democratise Mercosur decisions and optimise the political 
relations between the EU and Mercosur. The more concrete objectives are: (a) to 
improve the domestic transposition of Mercosur acts; (b) to reinforce the link 
between Mercosur decision making and the citizens in order to increase 
democratic legitimacy and public participation; (c) to transfer know-how relating 
to Parlasur’s administration, communication and management and to the 
functioning of political groups; and (d) to aid preparations for Parlasur direct 
elections. The results sought include improved citizen access to Mercosur 
institutions, better internal organisation of Parlasur, greater transparency and 
accountability of Mercosur institutions, and smoother coordination between 
Parlasur and national parliaments. The EU’s financial support for Parlasur 
amounted to some 900.000 euros in the period 2002-2006.88 
Finally, the second EU-Brazil summit agreed to ‘foster collaboration’ between 
Parlasur and the EP.89 Apart from the committees for foreign affairs (AFET), 
development (DEVE) and international trade (INTA), the main body within the 
EP that deals with Mercosur is the Delegation for relations with the Mercosur 
countries. This Delegation originates in the Delegation for relations with South 
America, which was renamed Delegation for South America and Mercosur in 1996 
and assumed its current name in 2004. From June 1991 to April 2008, the EP 
visited Brazilian officials on seven occasions within the arrangements for 
cooperation with Parlasur: five times by this Delegation (June 1991, March 1992, 
September 1995, June 2000 and June 2003), once by the EP Presidency (May 
1993) and once by a group of MEPs (November 2003).90 These visits were 
inspired by MEPs’ wishes to participate in interregional negotiations on economic 
                                                     
84 Emphasis added. 
85 C. Dri, ‘Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur 
Parliament’ (2010) 1 Latin American Policy, 63. 
86 European Commission, Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 [2007] E/2007/1640, 17. 
87 European Commission, Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 [2007] E/2007/1640, 29. 
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Janeiro, 22 December 2008, 14. 
90 Dri, ‘Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament’ 
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agreements and to fortify their own legitimacy by stimulating the creation of a new 
regional parliament.91 
This overview demonstrates that the relations between the EP and Parlasur 
aim to have the former assist the latter in strengthening its capacities rather than to 
spark legislative discussions. It has indeed been empirically shown that the EP was 
a role model for the establishment and empowerment of Parlasur.92 From the 
perspective of multilayered international parliamentarism, all of these activities 
benefit EU-Brazil relations. Within the auspices of EP-Parlasur collaboration, 
MEPs and Brazilian parliamentarians have ample opportunities for information 
exchange and institutional learning. 
 
C. Cooperation between the EP and the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) 
Established on 10 December 1964 in Lima, Parlatino is an independent, 
permanent, regional parliamentary organisation composed of 23 parliaments of 
South American and Caribbean states.93 Its structure was only finalised in 1987, 
when the Institutionalisation Treaty was agreed. Next to a Board of Directors and 
a General Secretariat, Parlatino is composed of an Assembly and 13 permanent 
committees. The Assembly is the supreme body of the organisation and gathers 
12-member national parliamentary delegations once a year in Parlatino’s seat in 
Panama City.94  
Parlatino possesses no decision-making authority other than to issue non-
binding declarations and recommendations, for which reason it has been described 
as a ‘symbolic rather than an operative body [that] lacks both political significance 
and social roots’.95 Nevertheless, Parlatino is a vivid example of a forum for 
                                                     
91 Dri, ‘Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament’ 
(2010) 1 Latin American Policy, 63. 
92 C. Dri, ‘Building the Mercosur Parliament: Integration on European Patterns?’ in J. Schoettli (ed.), 
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Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Paper No. 59 (Heildelberg: Uinversity of Heidelberg, 2011), p.162; 
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93 See a brief overview in: N. Rausseo, ‘El Rol del Parlamento Latinoamericano en el Fortalecimiento de 
las Instituciones de la Integración’, Paper prepared for VII Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma 
del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Lisbon, 8-11 October 2002, 
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September 2013]. 
94 Arts 12-14 Parlatino Statute of 2 August 1991, as amended in 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2007. 
95 A. Malamud and L. de Sousa, ‘Regional Parliaments in Europe and Latin America: Between 
Empowerment and Irrelevance’, in A.R. Hoffmann and A. van der Vleuten (eds), Closing or Widening the 
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Davor Jancic                                                             Multilayered International Parliamentarism  
 
 19
parliamentary diplomacy and deliberation,96 since it upholds not only the 
principles of democracy and regional integration, but also those of non-
intervention and self-determination, while condemning the use of force and 
promoting peaceful solutions to conflicts.97 Similarly, besides supporting 
representative democracy, constitutional and parliamentary development in Latin 
America, Parlatino’s purpose is to defend freedom, peace and security and 
suppress colonialism, imperialism and discrimination in all its guises.98 While 
currently an IPA, Parlatino is being considered as the parliamentary organ of the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States created in December 2011,99 
which would transform it into an IPO. 
Another rather ambitious objective of Parlatino is to ‘maintain relations with 
all parliaments of all geographical regions, as well as with international 
organisations’.100 Importantly, this includes relations with the EP, which were 
established in 1974 in the form of the EU-Latin American Interparliamentary 
Conference.101 This Conference, held every other year, helped tighten the 
historical, economic and cultural links between the European and Latin American 
regions and increase the parliamentarians’ knowledge of the political systems of 
the partner region.102 The key role of the Conference was to promote democracy, 
human rights protection and development in Latin America on the basis of 
European experiences.103 The Conference also recurrently examined the problem 
of Latin American external debt.104 For all its lack of power and infrequent 
meetings, Parlatino was among the rare forums for the promotion of pan-Latin 
American consensus on the pacification of Central America and the resolution of 
conflicts in the region.105 In this context, Parlatino-EP cooperation substantially 
contributed to the development of the ‘acquis’ of EU-LAC relations.106 
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Still, although Conference meetings played a part in ‘guiding the legislative 
acts and the political initiatives’ of the EP towards Latin America, MEPs 
themselves recognise that this forum has ‘little influence on parliamentary activity’, 
which is why this forum focused on political dialogue and exchange of views more 
than on policy making and legislative initiatives.107 Nonetheless, the EP was seen 
in Latin America as a driver of bilateral relations, whereby MEPs sought to insert 
this region on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy agenda.108 The 




4. THE EU RETURNS DIRECTIVE: MULTILAYERED 
INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN ACTION? 
 
The Returns Directive109 provides an excellent example of regulatory and 
legislative interdependence between the EU, Brazil and the Latin American region 
in general and of the way multilayered parliamentarism was employed to address 
the fallout created by the EU’s enactment of politically sensitive policies in the 
field of immigration. 
This Directive was fervently contested by many Latin American governments, 
regional organisations and parliamentary institutions.110 This, together with the 
concern expressed by the UN Human Rights Council over the protection of the 
fundamental rights of irregular migrants, was unprecedented in the history of EU 
legislation.111 The two most controversial provisions were those foreseeing the 
possibility of detaining irregular third-country migrants for up to 18 months and 
of imposing a re-entry ban of up to five years. The Directive was adopted at first 
reading without a single amendment by the EP, which succumbed to the Council’s 
pressure.112 This fact tarnished its democratic image and incurred international 
outcry.113 The two provisions were criticised not least by the Brazilian Congress, 
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Parlasur and Parlatino, all of which sent a strong message of indignation to the 
EU. 
On 26 June 2008, a week after the EP’s approval of the Directive, the 
Committee of Human Rights and Minorities of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 
adopted an Official Note against the Directive.114 Relying on the universality of 
human rights, this Note condemned it for colliding with the principles of 
coexistence, tolerance and prevalence of human rights, which constituted what 
was seen as a ‘grave historical setback’, given that millions of Europeans had 
settled in Latin America in the past 500 years. The Note warned that the Directive 
added to the losses caused by the EU’s unfair commercial policies and subsidies. 
The Committee therefore requested the EP to reconsider and modify its decision. 
This came several months after the same Committee sought to discuss with the 
European and Spanish parliaments the increased deportation of Brazilians from 
EU ports of entry, especially the deportation from the Madrid airport of a 
Brazilian physics student intent on attending a conference in Lisbon.115 This affair 
was discussed in a public hearing in the Committee for External Relations and 
National Defence.116 The latter Committee also repudiated the Directive.117 
Brazilian MPs criticised it in the plenary too. The Directive was called ‘the 
Directive of Shame’ for introducing the ‘delict of immigration’, which runs 
counter to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, as customary 
international law, enshrines a right for everyone to leave his or her own country 
and freely move and reside within the borders of each state.118 Brazilian senators 
also reacted in the plenary invoking similar arguments and seeking further 
reflection on the Directive from the EU.119 
Two days before the Chamber of Deputies issued its Official Note impugning 
the Directive, Parlatino adopted a declaration calling for a revision of the Directive 
so as to ‘eliminate its eminently repressive character’.120 Three days later, Parlasur 
followed suit with its own declaration rejecting the Directive as repugnant to 
human rights, calling upon the EP to review the Directive and inviting Mercosur 
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governments to take ‘corresponding measures’.121 The then Brazilian President of 
Parlasur, Dr. Rosinha, invoked the Latin American rejection of the Directive as an 
example of direct influence on intergovernmental decisions.122 
Having incurred much international reprimand, the EP sought to appease 
Latin American concerns within EuroLat, whose co-presidents issued a joint 
statement on 14 July 2008 recommending to intensify interparliamentary dialogue 
through various existing channels.123 This was followed on 6 November 2008, for 
the first time, by the novel out-of-session discussions between, on the one hand, 
the EuroLat Executive Bureau accompanied by all other EuroLat members and, 
on the other hand, Jacques Barrot, the then Vice-President of the Commission, 
who was in charge of the Directive.124 
Consequently, a working group on migration in EU-LAC relations (Working 
Group) was established within EuroLat in Madrid on 6 April 2009. The Working 
Group’s aims were threefold: (a) to draw up fundamental principles for a 
biregional consensus on migration, allowing differentiated treatment when EU 
legislation is applied to Latin American and Caribbean migrants; (b) to monitor the 
transposition of the Returns Directive in the EU Member States; and (c) to 
encourage the establishment of a Euro-Latin American migration observatory.125 
The Working Group was also to function as a watchdog taking stock of pending 
and future EU migration initiatives as well as of Latin American policies in this 
area.126 Some three months later, on 30 June 2009, a biregional intergovernmental 
dialogue on migration was launched. The Working Group thus had yet another 
impetus to accomplish its main objective, which was to draft recommendations for 
the next EU-LAC summit. This was completed on 15 May 2010 and the EU was 
strongly requested to ameliorate the legal regime of LAC migration. The Working 
Group warned that: ‘When transposing the Returns Directive, with which the 
LAC countries disagree, the EU Member States must retain the more favourable 
provisions already laid down in their domestic law’.127 It is notable that most 
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recommendations were cast in strong peremptory language demanding resolutely 
for very specific action to be taken. This means that the Directive led to a 
hardening of EuroLat pronouncements, because these had thereto mainly taken 
the form of declarations of purpose containing rather loose and advisory 
prescriptions.128 The Working Group recommendations were sent inter alia to the 
Council of the EU, the Commission and all national parliaments of the EU 
Member States. In line with the recommendations, a message was sent to the 6th 
EU-LAC summit, proposing to create a migration observatory for the EU-LAC 
area.129 In May 2011, the EP published its own study on such an observatory, 
which would harmonise databases, assess public policies and conduct research on 
migration.130Although the purpose of the Working Group was fulfilled with the 
submission of the said recommendations, EuroLat authorised the continuation of 
its activities chiefly because the 6th EU-LAC summit failed to address the issue of 
the observatory. The Working Group subsequently issued a joint proposal for the 
creation of the observatory in February 2012. Yet the activities of the Working 
Group go beyond this matter and its latest effort was to draft recommendations 
on impact of the economic and financial crises on EU-LAC migration. Ironically, 
the topicality of migration in biregional relations was proven in practice when 
certain Latin American representatives of EuroLat were reportedly subjected to 
discriminatory treatment when landing at Madrid and Frankfurt airports.131 
Most recently, in March 2014 the Commission published a report on the EU 
return policy, which identified shortcomings in the implementation of the Returns 
Directive and called for special attention to be paid when implementing the 
provisions related to the detention of returnees, the treatment of minors and the 
corresponding safeguards and legal remedies, all of which were the object of 
criticism by Brazilian and other Latin American parliamentarians. Furthermore, 
although the report makes no specific mention of the Latin American ‘uprising’ 
against the Directive, the Commission acknowledged that an effective 
management of irregular migration flows requires a comprehensive approach, 
which necessitates an ‘enhanced dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries 
of origin’ and the ‘integration of foreign policy aspects into the EU migration 
policy and ensuring linkages between the internal and the external dimensions’.132 
The EU executive hence recognised the impact of EU policy making on its 
international partners. 
The developments surrounding the Returns Directive exhibit the escalation 
of parliamentary activity via numerous frameworks including both bilateral and 
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multilateral forums. The aftermath of the Directive caused ‘parliamentary 
spillover’ of policy monitoring, which gave rise to new interparliamentary channels 
to tackle what was perceived by Latin American parliamentarians as prejudicing 
the rights of many of their nationals. Acting in an international environment, 
Brazilian, other Latin American and European parliamentarians therefore engaged 
in norm entrepreneurship, trying to exert peer pressure on the EU in the direction 
of policy alteration.133 Yet migration is not the only area where parliamentary 
rapprochement could add value. The global financial and European debt crises as 
well as the differing macroeconomic policies of the EU and the Brazil provide 
fodder for interparliamentary liaison, not least to avoid ‘mutual cognitive 
dissonance’, whereby the EU is viewed as ‘lecturing’ Brazil on economics and 
banking.134 Such goal-oriented interaction among parliaments is applicable to any 




5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This article has argued that international parliamentarism does not evolve merely 
in the form of isolated international parliamentary bodies, but that cooperation 
between parliamentarians beyond domestic borders may be structured in layers, 
whereby parliaments and their members act within several international 
parliamentary forums in the same period regarding the same region. The 
multilayered character of international parliamentary activity was demonstrated 
using the example of the Latin American region and an in-depth case study of EU-
Brazil interparliamentary relations. 
The preceding analysis shows that the layers of parallel parliamentary 
communication on diverse issues may furnish benefits for their participants that 
action within a single international interparliamentary framework might not. 
Opportunities for transferring knowledge and information both within one and 
the same participating parliament (e.g. among MEPs) and between two or more 
parliaments (e.g. between MEPs and Brazilian parliamentarians) are evident and 
they refer both to internal organisation and management and to interregional and 
global policy making. Intensified dialogue among parliamentarians may lead to the 
adoption of better policies domestically and a more coherent action globally. 
While international parliamentary bodies are sometimes admonished for 
serving as nothing more than venues for political marketing, they do have their 
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own agendas and, although their pronouncements are as a rule not normative, they 
carry significant political value insofar as they influence the topics deliberated in 
the EP, which is manifested by the number of resolutions adopted on topics 
related to Latin America.135 The reverse influence is beyond doubt and, in the case 
of Mercosur, it has been widely acknowledged. 
Where does this leave multilayered international parliamentarism and its 
utility for democratising international, interregional and domestic law and politics? 
Benefits are multiple and include increased policy deliberation, discussion and 
contestation, networking and socialisation, accumulation of knowledge and 
information, acquiry of skills, capacity building, assumption of joint positions, and 
the reduction of transnational regulatory irritants. However, even in a multilayered 
parliamentary world, constraints on the global action of parliamentarians, such as 
the lack of power to issue binding pronouncements, remain. Not only do these 
barriers diminish their clout, they limit their outreach to advocacy. Even so, 
concerted action by parliamentarians across a number of levels and within various 
frameworks might improve the prospects of influencing governmental actors and 
make them more accountable. 
The responses of the Brazilian Congress, Parlatino, Parlasur, the EP and 
EuroLat to the Returns Directive exemplify the functioning, advantages and 
obstacles of multilayered international parliamentarism. The establishment and 
continued work of the EuroLat Working Group on EU-LAC Migration, as well as 
the push for the creation of a migration observatory, are distinct products of 
parliamentary diplomacy that aim to enable ‘soft’ democratic control over 
decisions of biregional interest.136 While parliamentary activism was triggered by 
the Returns Directive, it was soon decoupled from what became a veritable 
migration saga that caused parliamentarians to embark on a much wider 
investigation of biregional policy making. For the EP, increased contact with 
Brazilian and other Latin American parliamentarians can both further its 
democracy promotion agenda and fortify its position in the ongoing rivalry with 
the Commission and the Council in conducting EU foreign affairs.137 For the 
Brazilian Congress, intensified relations with MEPs represent a channel through 
which to voice their preoccupation over the EU’s inconsistent treatment of Brazil 
as a Western Latin American country, a Mercosur member and a BRICS 
country,138 and thus mitigate politico-economic friction while nurturing common 
understandings. This is all the more important because the EU is perceived in 
Brazil as both an opportunity as well as a challenge to the latter’s national 
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interest.139 Namely, during both Lula and Rousseff administrations, Brazil and the 
EU held conflicting views on trade and there was little overlap in their strategy 
preferences in multilateral international institutions.140 Closer parliamentary ties 
may contribute to reducing the negative consequences thereof. Significantly, the 
EU-Brazil interparliamentary partnership is indispensable for democratic 
legitimacy insofar as they engender new public spaces that ‘play a critical role in 
setting limits on government, above and beyond those controls already enshrined 
in formal state institutions’.141 
Finally, while inspired by their domestic electoral mandates and constitutional 
prerogatives, the roles that parliamentarians perform on the interregional and 
global plane are cast in ‘soft’ instruments, such as recommendations and messages. 
Rather than legislating, they advocate legal solutions. Instead of censuring 
governments, they exert pressure for policy change. Though the ultimate goal of 
international parliamentarism is to influence intergovernmental decision making, 
this is an inherently incremental process that is premised on a much more 
informal capacity to mobilise political support and steer policy development.142 In 
this regard, multilayered international interactions between parliamentarians 
facilitate the production of critical masses in favour or against certain policy 
enactments and, as such, feed the overall democratic process. In Habermas’ 
vernacular, the discursive character of their opinion-formation unleashes ‘the 
generative force of communicative freedom’,143 which helps shape the public 
sphere and the democratic frame of lawmaking.  
In the global arena, the greatest contribution of parliaments to democracy is 
to facilitate the public exposure of contested decisions, whereby elected officials 
discuss and publicise their vices and virtues in an exchange of policy-oriented 
arguments. The parliaments’ chronic lack of ‘hard’ constitutional powers of 
legislation and accountability in the international sphere shifts focus towards 
deliberation as the substantive element of the political process. To the extent that 
this constitutes political constraint, it is possible to conceive of multilayered 
international parliamentarism as the nucleus of a rudimentary and composite form 
of proto-global parliamentarism and constitutionalism. 
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